FORUM ON OFFSHORE DRILLING
OIL SPILL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE IN THE GULF

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Transcript
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BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT --
Michael. R. Bromwich, Director
Lars Herbst
William Hauser

PANEL I

Gary Rook: Technical Director, Edison Chouest Offshore
John Dane: President and CEO, Trinity Yachts
Jim Adams: President, Offshore Marine Service Association
Donald W. Davis: Former Administrator, Louisiana Applied and Educational Oil Spill Research and Development Program.
Kevin Costner: Co-Founder, Ocean Therapy Solutions and Blue Planet Solutions.

PANEL II

Gene Taylor: U.S. Congressman
Connie Moran: Mayor of the City of Ocean Springs
Connie Rockco: Harrison County Board of Supervisors, District 5
Michael Mangum: Jackson County Supervisor

Reported by: Lisa Hood Brown, CSR

COAST-WIDE REPORTERS

P R O C E E D I N G S

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Good morning, everybody.

It's good to be here. We're here in Biloxi, Mississippi today to conduct the seventh of our eight public forums on offshore drilling. We started this series of forums in early August in New Orleans. Since then we've been in Mobile, Alabama; Pensacola, Florida; Santa Barbara, California; Anchorage, Alaska; and Houston, Texas.

The purpose of these forums is to gather information on three critical issues that relate to the moratorium on deepwater drilling that was imposed by Secretary Ken Salazar on July 12th, 2010. The basis of the moratorium were concerns about three sets of related issues, the first being drilling and workplace safety; the second being spill containment; and the third being oil spill response. Today's forum will focus primarily on oil spill preparedness and response, although we will -- we will stray into other related issues as well, I'm sure.

The format today will be similar to the format that we followed in our other forums. We will have panels of distinguished presenters. And today we will have the first panel whose members

are on stage right now. We'll then take a break and we'll have a second panel composed of elected officials from the local area, mayors, congressmen, and so forth. The format will be I will give a very brief presentation just framing the general issues. I'll then turn it over to the presenters. They will each give their

presentations in turn. We will then ask questions on this side of the table to the presenters, and we'll go from there. So why don't we go ahead and start.

As I said, the purpose of the forums is to focus on the issues that relate to the current deepwater drilling moratorium. On July 7th, Secretary Salazar asked me to hold these forums in order to collect a combination of expert and public input on the three issues that I mentioned before; that is, drilling and workplace safety; wild well intervention and spill respon- -- and spill containment; and finally, last but not least, oil spill response capabilities for both offshore drilling and production.

The central purpose of these forums has remained the same since we started about a month and a half ago, and that is to determine whether

there is sufficient evidence to modify in any way the scope or the duration of the deepwater drilling moratorium that is currently in effect until November 30th. We're interested in hearing from you. We have a method, both through cards outside but also through submitting comments to our website, which is listed on this slide. We have received quite a few comments online and we look forward to receiving more in the future.

The importance of deepwater drilling, I think, is known to all of us. There are literally tens of thousands of workers who are employed in

the Gulf of Mexico in the offshore oil and gas industry. We all know that domestic energy production is central to the health of the economy, to this nation's energy independence, and also to our national security. The Gulf of Mexico alone accounts for approximately 30 percent of domestic oil production and approximately 12 percent of domestic natural gas production.

The Deepwater Horizon explosion and the related tragedy has underscored like no event before the importance of drilling safety and effective oil spill response and has focused all of us on the questions of the risks involved.

Deepwater spills have a potentially devastating effect on a wide range of industries and personnel including fishing and shrimping, tourism, wildlife, the ocean and coastal environments, as well as a broad range of local communities. The only way to minimize the harm once an oil spill actually occurs is through a rapid and effective oil spill response, which is the primary issue that we're going to be addressing today.

Again, just by way of background, we're all by now all too familiar with the terrible tragedy that took the lives of eleven rig workers who died when the Macondo well it blew out and exploded on April 20th of this year. That spill has had a dramatic effect on the ocean and the coastal environments throughout the Gulf of Mexico. Literally hundreds of miles of shoreline and

wetlands in the Gulf have been affected by the deepwater spill and in, so far, untold ways.

The Gulf ecosystem will be affected by -- affected including marine plankton, fish and shellfish, birds, marine mammals, and other wildlife. As I mentioned, the spill has also had a major impact on the economy in the Gulf, including the fishing, shrimping, tourism,

commercial retail and other industries throughout this region.

Let me focus for a couple of minutes on some of the resources that have been deployed in the Deepwater Horizon clean-up effort. Spill response resources really from across the nation were mobilized for the cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon spill. That included, among many other things, literally tens of thousands of people, millions of feet of boom, thousands of vessels, and approximately one hundred helicopters and aircraft.

It is unfortunately acknowledged that our current oil spill response plans are inadequate. Industry representatives have acknowledged, both publicly and to those of us in the Department of Interior, that they have not been well equipped to handle worst-case scenarios.

Industry regional response planned -- regional response plans proved thoroughly inadequate to address the Deepwater Horizon spill. Among other things, they overestimated the daily

recovery capacity of skimming systems in the open ocean; they failed to account for the spreading of oil and the significant shoreline impact; and

their plans failed to provide for the necessary rapid mobilization of equipment from both domestic and international sources.

Let's focus on that inadequacy, the inadequacy of oil spill response resources. There was an unprecedented deployment of resources to the Deepwater Horizon site and the regional shorelines. But among other things, that raised questions about the industry's ability to respond should a second deepwater spill have occurred. Thankfully, it did not, but that was the great fear that many of us in the Department and many members of the public had at that time.

Industry executives testified before Congress that they had, in fact, deployed all available resources to respond to the Deepwater Horizon spill so that, in fact, there was nothing left. And in a June 28th, 2010 meeting at the Department of Interior, industry was unable to provide assurances to us that sufficient resources existed to address a second oil spill, had that occurred, while the response to the Deepwater Horizon spill was ongoing.

The Coast Guard determined that the number of oil skimming vessels was inadequate to recover the

oil released from the spill. And, accordingly, the Coast Guard and EPA amended their oil spill response requirements to allow various commercial and military vessels normally required to be available for spills in other regions of the country to be deploy -- to be deployed to the Deepwater Horizon site.

NOAA stated that it was fully engaged in responding to the Deepwater Horizon spill and that it would have had grave difficulties in responding if another spill had occurred simultaneously in any other U.S. location.

In addition, as we found, there are weather-related complications that make oil spill response that much more difficult. Clean-up operations during hurricane season are subject to various weather-related complications, difficulties, and delays. Among others, the response crews cannot conduct skimming or controlled burn operations when seas are in turmoil. There are increased wave heights that may cause boom to break apart and, therefore, be ineffective in some areas. And in addition, storm surges may distribute oil over a wider geographic area and carry the oil into the coastline and inland. Although Tropical Storm

skimmers responding to the Deepwater Horizon spill to return to shore.

In short, industry must develop more effective oil spill response techniques, and that is what we're here to discuss today.

I'm Michael Bromwich. I'm the Director of the Bureau Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement. And with me today, before I introduce our presenters, are two distinguished members of our agency.

Sitting to my immediate left is Lars Herbst. Lars is the Regional Director of the agency's Gulf of Mexico region. He is a petroleum engineer by training and has led the Gulf region of our agency since 2007. He served in various positions with the region's field operations since 1983.

Sitting to Lars' left is Bill Hauser. Bill is the Chief of the Rules and Standards branch of our agency. He served in headquarters capacity for approximately 20 years. Earlier in his career, Bill served as a petroleum engineer in the Alaska region.

Let me introduce our first panel. Starting

closest to my left is Gary Rook. Gary is the technical director for Edison Chouest Offshore. He is actively engaged in working directly with both the American Bureau of Shipping and the Coast Guard in the development of new rules and regulations for U.S. flagged offshore support vessels, including oil spill response vessels. He

has designed and supervised the construction of the largest oil spill response vessel currently in the U.S. fleet, the MV NANUQ. He was also responsible for the major conversion of two platform supply vessels as high-efficiency skimming vessels for the Deepwater Horizon spill response. Gary's presentation will focus importantly on the lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon response effort.

Sitting to Gary's left is John Dane, III. John is president and CEO of Trinity Yachts and Trinity Offshore, which is based in Gulfport, Mississippi, with additional operations in New Orleans, Louisiana. John has had a 36-six-year shipbuilding career in which he's had experience building yachts, commercial vessels, barges, patrol craft and, most relevant to this panel discussion, skimmer vessels ranging from 30 feet

to the largest at 208 feet. John is also currently the majority owner of United States Marine, Inc., a company that builds high-tech patrol boats for the U.S. Navy and other navies around the world.

Sitting to John Dane's left is Jim Adams. Jim is the Interim President and CEO of the Offshore Marine Service Association. Jim's been involved in transportation public policy for more than 20 year. During his career, he has been a Coast Guard officer, a congressional staffer, and a barge line and railroad public affairs

executive. He has considerable experience in oil spill response having served as the public affairs officer in the unified command during the 2008 Mississippi River spill in New Orleans.

Sitting to Jim's left is Donald Davis. Dr. Davis is a geographer and former member of the research faculty at Nichols State University and LSU. While at LSU, Dr. Davis worked in the Center for Coastal Energy and Environment Resources for three years. In 1993, he became the administrator for the state's oil spill research and development program. Dr. Davis has written or coauthored numerous papers on Louisiana's wetlands. His

presentation will focus on the people involved in the economic transformation of Louisiana's near-sea-level marshes and swamps and the growth and development of the state's oil spill program.

Sitting to Dr. Davis' left is Kevin Costner. Kevin is an internationally recognized and accomplished actor, director, producer, and musician. For the past seventeen years, he's focused his energy and his assets on developing and making a commercially applicable oil water separator that is based on patented technology he originally acquired from the Department of Energy that has now been developed into a state-of-the-art oil spill clean-up technology. Recently this technology was deployed in the Gulf of Mexico clean-up efforts for the Deepwater Horizon spill. Mr. Costner is here today to talk

about lessons learned in the Gulf and to talk more specifically about oil spill response.

So we have, as you can hear, a very qualified and distinguished panel of presenters. The format will be that each one will give their presentation. We won't ask any questions until the last presenter has concluded, and then Mr. Herbst, Mr. Hauser, and I will ask some

questions of each of the panelists. So, thank you very much and we'll move right to our first presenter. Gary.

MR. ROOK: Thank you, Director. Ladies and gentlemen, as the Director stated, my name is Gary Rook and I'm the technical director for the Edison Chouest Offshore group of companies. We represent many phases of the shipbuilding and marine industry, ship design, vessel operations. Today I'd like to present to you what we feel we've learned from the Horizon incident and what we feel the challenges to go forward in deepwater drilling.

We see three primary areas: Better well construction planning, execution of those plans, verification and approvals of those plans; a rapid response containment system; and rapid response deepwater oil recovery assets, which is what we'll focus on today.

Just a quick about ECO. We were very involved in Horizon. We were first responders on scene within an hour assisting in search and

rescue, firefighting efforts, also with ROVs. Our ROVs, our remotely operated vehicles, were the first ones that you saw at the blowout preventer

on the TV and on the Internet screens. They were flying off of ECO vessels and they're ECO ROVs.

Again, firefighting -- and I just want to point out here that we're not trying to put the fire out. We know we can't do that. We're trying to cool the structure so it stays afloat longer. We're one of the several companies now being sued because we put water on the rig and it sank, eventually. But, again, we're trying to keep it cool so it stays up longer. Another note here, really, there are no requirements for firefighting vessels on in the Gulf of Mexico on any -- any vessels.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Gary, I know from firsthand experience you can't do a good deed without getting sued, so I completely understand.

MR. ROOK: Yes. We also were involved in spill response as the director said earlier. We converted two PSVs with high-efficiency skimmers and booms for this process.

Just some other things. We were involved in Top Hat, Jump Shot, Top Kill. All of the different activities of this particular problem were -- a lot of them working off our vessels. We'll also be doing the Bottom Kill when it comes

around.

Challenges, there are some major ones. We need to have rapid response to spill. It needs to really be immediate. We need to be able to skim 24 hours a day, not 12. Skimming needs to continue in bad weather, as you mentioned earlier. We need a higher capacity of storage for recovered oil offshore in the skimming vessels, and we need to be able to have better configurations and control of those configurations to be able to achieve a maximum encounter rate with the oil.

If you take a look here, this is from day two or three. You see there's already a significant amount of oil in the water. You can see it here. You can already see it. We're still fighting the fire, but there's oil already in the water.

We had two short periods where the activities were stopped due to rough weather, but other than that, we were flat calm for this. We were really lucky. That's not going to be the case in the future and we all know it, so we have to be able to get out there and skim oil in rough weather. This means better equipment, better SRVs.

This is a picture of a vessel of opportunity and booms that were provided for that. As you can

see, it's got a very narrow swath width, which is the opening of the boom to the oil. Also, there's

a lot of entrained oil going under the boom. You can see behind it here that there's a lot of oil going underneath. This boom is not very effective. Even in calm water, a lot of oil is getting by it.

Deepwater Horizon, we were limited to daylight. Sun goes down, skimming stopped. That was what the command want. We've got to be able to skim all day. Twenty-four hours in a day. We need twenty-four hours to pick up oil.

This is part of the current fleet. These are the MSRC vessels. And I point out that these vessels are as big as they can get under current rules. Nothing wrong with these vessels. They're fine vessels. They can hold 4000 barrels of oil, but they're designed specifically for a near-shore situation based on VALDEZ where you had a finite amount of oil in a specific location in a rather sheltered place. We're deep ocean, all open. We need bigger vessels, more capable, more -- more capacity.

This is a picture of one of the vessels that we did convert. As you can see, we added 6000

barrels of storage above deck, another 12,000 barrels below deck, but we didn't have time to convert that because of time, really. We have a high-efficiency skimmer and boom added. We had oil/water separator units added as well to make sure that we're storing oil and not oily water when we pick it up.

Here is some examples of vessels of opportunity, OSVs and shrimp boats. All, again, narrow swath widths I'm going to talk about later. Shrimp boats doing near-shore, that's very ineffective. A shrimp boat can skim up some oil, but what do you do with it? You know, you throw an absorbent boom out or you wait for somebody to come along and pick it up. They're not very effective.

And while it's a little outside the scope of what we're offering today, we feel like that it's very important that we get a better shoreline protection plan. I mean, depending on miles of booms that are ineffective, putting it around your islands and your shore, sand berms, shrimp boats doing this, it's really not effective. There needs to be a better plan developed for that, as well.

Here's -- following I'll go through some of the solutions that we see. This is an aerial satellite photo that represents 1.5 square miles of ocean and there's six skimming configurations in there. You'll see I put numbers by each one of the skimming configurations. I imported this picture into our CAD program so it's to scale. There was an actual scale here that allowed me to do that, so this is to scale.

You'll notice I put dimensions on all of the configurations at their openings, and they're very narrow for what they need to be doing. Totaling

up of 1750 feet of swath width, so that means that there -- for the six configurations for fourteen vessels, they're covering 1750 feet of ocean to pick up the oil.

I've noted the direction of the skim in arrows. You can see there's no real control over it. They're just going pretty much where they want to go and they're not even in the area of the most oil, which is right here.

This is a J configuration. It consists of a high-capacity boom boat here, high-capacity skimmer in the apex of the configur- -- J configuration with the boom here and boom boat up

here. This is a proven configuration that works in Europe. And you add in front of that a U, which is two more -- let me go back. Here you add a U in front, which is a single boom from two boats connected with a chain in the middle essentially forming a funnel. This allows you to cover 2300 feet.

Now, if you take those, put of them side by side and put it over a mile and a half of ocean, we can do some good there. We're going in the right direction, recovering the oil. Everybody is working in concert with each other. We've got 4600 feet of coverage, 2.6 times the swath width of the others, with six less vessels.

This picture doesn't have anything to do with Horizon, but it's a North Sea situation. You can see there's a pretty serious leak coming from the

rig and you've got a skimmer also with a modified J boom configuration downcurrent of the rig. It allows you -- they're picking up the oil right off the rig.

Now, just for giggles, I took that and I put that on my picture of the Horizon burning in the flow of oil which is coming this way in the current. You can see one configuration, two

configurations, and one behind. This covers -- more than covers all the oil coming off of that thing.

Now, I'm no so stupid to think we're going to get all the oil, but we're going to get a lot of it right there, all right. And what's entrained and comes underneath this, we've got another one behind. Now, what this means is you've got to have the boats out there immediately and ready to go.

Another thing is to bring deepwa- -- dynamic positioning technology into this. You need to be able to control the positions of the boats with DP. Every one of these boats we're proposing has DP. The skimmer vessel would position each one of the vessels in the configuration based on LIDAR scans, which is a reading from the boats. The DP controller off the skimmer vessel would position every boat in the proper position so it remains in configuration.

This is some examples of heavy weather booms that are in existence today and can be used.

These booms are effective up to thirteen meters of significant wave height. Now, that don't mean they're going to be as good, but they can do it up

to twenty-six maximum.

Here are some points that we think should define an open ocean skimmer -- skimmer. I'm not going to go into each one. To summarize them, high storage capacity. Separators to ensure that oil, not oily water, is stored. High-efficiency skimmers and booms. Slow speed capability to tow the booms, which will require CP props or a variable frequency drive. Three booms carried on one of these vessels; one for a J configuration, which the skimmer will be a part of; and then two to hand off for vessels of opportunity to make the U. Oil sensing radar to find the oil, IR or laser-based device, so you can determine the thickness of oil in the configuration. UV search lights so you can see the oil at night.

This is an example of a vessel like this. This is a similar vessel to what you saw in the picture of a conversion earlier, basically, with all of this equipment that I just mentioned installed, as well storage and below-deck tanks here for up to 15,000 barrels of oil. In our fleet, there's over thirty of these that could be converted. I'm not doing that as a sales pitch for us. I'm just saying the vessels are there.

There are a lot of other vessels out there that other operators have that are similar to these. Six to eight weeks to do a conversion such as this.

A couple of areas where I think that the government can help us. Obviously, we need new rules for OSRVs, and I just point out that ABS has a new set of rules they're doing right now that's a good a guide for us to go by. And this part is very important. The Coast Guard and Congress have to revise regulations, policies, and statutes that limits the size of U.S. flag OSRVs. We need to get equal to the rest of the world.

Here's some North Sea spill standby vessels. These are all very capable and very large vessels. They're configured for standby. As well as spill -- they do lifesaving rescue as well as spill response.

This is the NANUQ, as the Director mentioned earlier. It's an example of a type of vessel that's needed. It's a 300-foot, state-of-the-art combination OSRV built in 2007. Gross tonnage of this vessel is 3575 tons, 12,000-barrel capacity, fully complies with all ABS and Coast Guard requirements for a Class 1 OSRV. Here's a picture

of the NANUQ in Alaska. Here's a picture of the NANUQ doing spill response training in Alaska.

Summarizing. Even though designed, approved, built, inspected and tested and delivered as a Class I OSRV by both ABS and Coast Guard, NANUQ has the following restrictions placed on its COI by the Coast Guard. In Alaska, they must request a letter from the Coast Guard as a vessel of opportunity before skimming oil, and other than Alaska, we have to go to headquarters for that.

So, in summary, the NANUQ, even though the largest and most capable OSRV in the U.S. fleet, currently is restricted by the Coast Guard to an operational authority equal to this vessel.

Why? Well, summarizing, again, OSRVs must be certified. Current policy and law states that to be a dual service OSRV, you must be less than 500 tons. NANUQ, which is greater than 500 tons, has got to request a vessel of opportunity just like a shrimp boat. We first asked for a laxation of this in 2007; no action by the Coast Guard. Again, asked for it in 2009. This was the response from the Coast Guard, and I'm going to read this directly.

"The Coast Guard remains concerned about the

proposal's impact on the dedicated fleet of oil spill response vessels and, by extension, the Nation's overall oil spill response capability -- capacity.

Specifically, the Coast Guard is concerned that the enactment of this provision could irreparably diminish that capacity in the Gulf.

While there's little appreciable effect on safety and environmental protection, altering the status quo enabl- -- enabling current OSVs to compete against dedicated OSRVs would likely have a detrimental effect on the Nation's oil spill response capacity."

Well, they said that. I think they were wrong, and I think it needs to be fixed. And, Director Bromwich, I'm going to ask you today to help us with this because we're hitting our heads against the wall, and we need the help of your agency to get this taken care of.

Everybody knows that Deepwater Horizon showed that the regulations of our U.S. flag spill response fleet is not where it needs to be. We need new regulations. ABS is currently revising theirs, as I mentioned earlier. We know how long it takes to get Federal stuff done, so any new

regulations coming out of the Coast Guard are going to be several years at the best. We recommend that we should be able to use the new ABS rules, which are going to be ready at the end of this year, for any future buil- -- new building of OSRVs or conversions of OSRVs until the Coast Guard finishes theirs.

In closing, I think we can all agree that neither industry or government handled the Horizon incident effectively. We think the future is -- is much wider. The government, the authorities are committed to elevated levels of controls and

oversight for deepwater drilling. The drilling industry has committed a billion dollars through their newly-formed Marine Well Containment Company to develop a viable containment system to be effective to 10,000 feet of depth and contain 100,000 barrels a day.

The vessels that are ready now to convert that can perform the spill response duties that we discussed earlier, the conversions being about two months per vessel. Increased levels of safety by the drilling company reduces the possibility of blowout, but if one should occur, the new containment technology and improved spill response

vessels and techniques will minimize any impacts that the discharge of oil will have on the ecology of the region. Thanks.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Great. Thank you very much, Gary. Appreciate it. John Dane.

MR. DANE: Where do I point that?

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: It's in the process of loading. It'll be up there in just a second.

MR. DANE: Well, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to this forum and to follow Gary. Gary's touched mostly on the deepwater side. That fits in well with where Trinity's interest is and our experience recently, and that's on the shallow water clean-up spill area.

The Director spoke already about the inadequacies. One was overestimated capacity, failed to account for the spreading oil on the

shoreline, failure to provide the rapid mobilization, and the fact that the industry is incapable of handling a second spill, and lastly the Coast Guard determined the number of skimming vessels was inadequate. I've taken these from your prior presentation, Director.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: They got to be right then.

MR. DANE: Right. What we see the following improvements need, one is, as you said, to develop the rapid and effective oil response plan. We see a few things that could help that. One is to have these high -- have multiple fleets of highly mobile skimming vessels available on a short notice, on standby. What was shown also was to increase the number of deep water recovery vessels, and this is what Gary talked about. There's really not that number of boats in the United States to do that. And then design and build vessels that now, once they pick it up, they can process it offshore so they're just not bringing in mostly water and just a little bit of the oil; then, design new boats and increase the fleet that can operate coastal in three to four feet of water; and then the shallow water vessels in one to two feet. They're all different classes of vessels to chase and try and clean up the oil.

The other thing Gary spoke about is rely less on the vessels of opportunity. They're like putting a Band-Aid on the situation and really

don't do a lot of good. And increasing the skimming time, reduce the transit time, and reduce the offloading time. Just get higher, more

efficient boats that can work at night, et cetera, as Gary spoke, and continue to develop new technologies for these spills.

What's that? I'm sorry. Yeah, okay. There you go.

People wonder what's Trinity's experience in this and why am I up here on this panel. Well, since 1977 we built our first skimmers for Pemex. We built an 80-foot -- eight 30-foot Oil Mop skimmers in 1977. I don't know why the pictures aren't coming up.

MR. ROOK: You've got to point it at it.

MR. DANE: Oh, point it at it. I mean, it's moving.

But, we built a 50-foot aluminum catamaran skimmer in 88; a 65-foot coastal recovery vessels in '92, and we built 12 of those big 208-foot MSRC skimmers that you saw, the blue boats in a lot of Gary's pictures. In the last hundred days since this spill, we built 11 of the 30-foot Marco/Kvichak fast response skimmers. We built five 35-foot shuttle work barges. We built three 249- barrel recovered oil mini-barges. We built one 156-foot prototype very shallow multi-system skimmer vessel. All total we've got -- we built

44 vessels of eight different designs in our history.

Here are the pictures now. You can see the variety of boats. There's so many different ways to try and clean up oil. I mean, this is one that could be coast-wise where it can operate in three- to four-foot seas, yet still shallow water. This is the big MSRC boat. These are the rapid response skimmers, the Marco design, that the state bought five of, and we built a number of these for BP for this spill.

This is our 35-foot new design that we built seven of. This is the recovered oil barge, so when you go out and the small boats pick up oil, they put them in these shallow water barges because these small boats can only carry a thousand or 2000 gallons of fuel, and these are 249-barrel barges. You ask why 249; because there's a Federal law that if it's 250, you need a tanker man on, which drives the cost up, so everyone stays just under that limit. This is our new 56-foot prototype that's capable of storing 238 barrels of oil. And it's still going 25 miles an hour and work in shallow water.

So what we think -- we've developed what we

think is a good shallow water clean-up plan, and it includes multiple vessels. And what we believe

the optimum fleet, just as Gary was showing what he would do in deepwater, we think that if we had this shallow water skimmer task force, each one would have two of these 249-barrel barges. They would be anchored there waiting to receive oil as it's picked up. We'd have two of these 35-foot shuttle work barges which can also skim. So they would be putting booms out. They would be shuttling crew back and forth. They also could put a bow skimmer or a side skimmer on them and pick up up to 1300 gallons of recovered fluid, take them over to the 249-barrel barge as part of the operation.

The third part would be the -- one of the 56-footers, which also stores oil, but can go very quickly to the site. On this one, we have a design for a multi-system skimmer. It's got a bow skimmer conveyor. It's got side floating skimmers. We've also designed them with excavators and vacuum system, and we've even done some with the Costner centrifuge we've done some designs on.

And the last part of this fleet would be then

offshore where it's a little deeper, we'd have a 5000-barrel fuel barge or oil barge which would have the centrifuges on it also to treat it.

This is a picture of the 56-foot, very shallow multi-system skimmer. You can see on the bow where it's got a conveyor that's a typical for the small boats to -- one way to pick up oil. On

the side, you see it's got a floating skimmer, a weir skimmer, which is very similar to what even the big boats put inside those booms to pick up oil. This boat, after we met with Billy Tozan (phonetic) in Louisiana and he talked about what he'd need to do in the shallow water marsh, he said, At some point, we've just got to go pick it up, so we've even got an excavator you can see on the bow there to handle picking up the gunk and gook that forms in some of these things.

Another system we've talked about was the vacuum system where you can go vacuum up some of this oil in the marsh. A lot of this -- again, this is all for shallow water operation. This is a third option for our shallow water where we actually go pin two more barges to this 56-footer so that when we've got the 238 barrels of oil on there, the total unit only draws 18 inches of

water, so we can go in very, very shallow water and recover oil.

Again, you know, it all gets down to these are great ideas we've all got. What are the possible funding sources. The name of the game is who's going to pay for this. One, obviously, what we all know is the Marine Well Containment Company, which is made up of Chevron, Conoco, Phillips, Exxon, Mobil, Shell, they're funding a billion dollars' worth of equipment. They've got their list. I'm not sure where shallow water -- how much is involved in that.

The second method is the expansion by existing cooperative groups that are out there right now that are funded by the -- all the oil companies. The third is an expansion by existing spill response companies that are just independent. A fourth could be new entities entering the market depending on what Federal regulations happen.

The third is to pass some legislation such as -- which has been recently proposed to increase the tax on imported oil from eight cents to thirty-four cents to fund the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, which has -- but unfortunately that

was recently stripped out of a bill that had passed through Congress; and lastly, Federal stimulus funds.

We're talking a lot of shipbuilding jobs if we -- if we get a directive to -- the industry needs certain amounts of vessels and capabilities, both deepwater, coastal and shallow water, that I would tell you we would certainly appreciate all the jobs down here in the South in the area that's been impacted by this oil spill. Thank you.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Thank you very much. Jim.

MR. ADAMS: Thank you, Director Bromwich, Mr. Dane, Mr. Rook. I follow two OMSA members, so it's a pleasure. My name is Jim Adams and I'm Interim President of the Offshore Marine Service Association. Just wait for this to come up.

OMSA is the national trade association of U.S. flag vessels that support our offshore energy sector. Our skilled crews and vessels are the lifeline between the offshore rigs and the mainland. Our vessels deliver personnel, supplies, and the latest deepwater technology. Our shipyards build and design -- build and design vessels known for their technological innovation.

Although vessels of opportunity, OMSA members were the backbone of the Macondo spill response. OMSA members delivered booms, skimmed oil, applied deep-sea dispersants, and operated the ROVs that brought live video feeds of the wellhead. Our vessels were the first on scene, and they very likely will be the last to leave.

Backed up here. Sorry about that.

Our industry serves the oil and drilling companies that BOEM -- that BOEM regulates. OMSA vessels and our personnel are regulated by the Coast Guard, but we depend on BOEM's regulation of our customers. We recognize the entire offshore energy industry must be much better prepared with response planning, spill training, drills, and improved recovery technology. OMSA is committed to working together to enhance public safety and restore public confidence in the offshore industry.

On April 22nd, the DAMON B. BANKSTON's crew rescued 115 survivors from the BP Offshore Horizon. The DAMON is owned by one of our leading

members, Trinity -- excuse me -- Tidewater Marine.

From the start, OMSA members deployed the human expertise to engineer, source, and mobilize

surface and subsea response solutions. During the response, OMSA members mobilized more that 500,000 barrels of tank barge capacity for spill recovery. While we are most often deemed vessels of opportunity, OMSA members' equipment was often larger and more capable than the vessels deployed by dedicated oil spill response companies.

Our vessels safely deployed boom, sprayed dispersants, skimmed the surface, lightened smaller vessels, separated oily water, and continue to monitor the quality of the Gulf today. We delivered the subsea construction and well intervention marine assets required to contain the spill.

We operated some of the world's largest vessels in their -- of their class and fulfilled primary roles on the top and static kills. Our members' capital investment built the logistics infrastructure at Port Fourchon which played such an indispensable role in the mobilization effort.

I want to address one issue here regarding the Jones Act. The Jones Act actually facilitated the nation's response capability. The Jones Act obstruction of response is a myth. Let me just slow this thing down. U.S. and foreign flag

vessels work side by side, as you can see in this diagram. Admiral Allen indicated that there was never an issue of Jones act waivers that affected the response. And I'd like to go on record. OMSA would support such waivers in national emergency in this case and in future cases.

In total, over 2 million barrels of Jones Act tank barge capacity was delivered to the Gulf. That's important because that's all domestic capacity. It was available during this time in large measure because of a downturn in the nation's economy. We have to look forward, not only to skimming technology, but if we're going to recover oily water and ultimately oil, we have to think about the capacity to store that product at sea.

The Bipartisan Policy Center's letter to the National Commission on Deepwater -- I'm sorry. This thing is getting ahead of me -- suggested a few things I'd like to point out. First, we must balance the risk and opportunities from domestic production. Second, DOI should adopt a strategic plan in reviewing industry compliance with new safety requirements to ensure that whenever possible the safe resumption of drilling does not

They asked the question, What can DOI do to encourage existing human and physical infrastructure to remain in the region to ensure sufficient capacity to respond quickly and effectively -- effectively in the event of a spill? And our industry is on the cusp of very dramatic change that's a result of an economic slowdown that's due to regulatory oversight and ensuring that we have the ability to respond in the future.

The response capacity is at risk. The vessel capacity that responded to the spill are finding other markets. Plans for new vessels have been put on hold. Shipyards will close. Companies will go out of business. Skilled mariners will leave the industry. Without work in the Gulf, the most technologically competitive and capable OMSA vessels will pursue foreign markets. Hundreds of OMSA member vessels may lay idle or be sold for other uses.

Pain has been deferred due to the prudent actions of the oil companies. They've held vessels on scene for -- as they wait for

regulatory clarity. But that patience will have an end. Pain has also been deferred by the fact that so many of our vessels have been held as response vessels in the spill. But again, that time period is coming to a quick end. We need regulatory clarity that would describe a resumption of activity, exploration, and

development.

A vibrant Gulf is a safe Gulf. The current fleet of over 1200 OMSA-member company vessels was built to serve the thousands of production platforms and 33 deepwater and approximately 50 shallow water rigs that were operating in April of 2010. Without exploration, this industry's future is bleak if regulations fail to resume drilling, along with a concurrent program to implemented higher standards. So we need a two-track system. Raise the bar, but continue economic activity, otherwise we'll have an economic displacement of resources that we will need in the future.

A vibrant Gulf economy will support new marine investment, apply the latest technology and support aggressive research and development programs.

A great example of the innovation and the

commitment of OMSA members to this economy is Port Fourchon. Let me see if I can pull it up there. We have a public investment here of about 156 million dollars. This is the hub for the Gulf energy industry. We have private capital investment of 1.55 billion dollars for a total of 1.7 billion dollars. That kind of innovation -- and I would encourage Director Bromwich, if you haven't visited Port Fourshon, there's so much to learn there, so much to see. If your staff members that are working on the policies that you confront could make that visit, I think it would

be well worth your while.

We face a regular dilemma. Ironically, without a rational, planned regulatory transition built upon a resumption of safe exploration with current development and implementation of regulation, the vessels and mariners needed on the longer term to protect the Gulf will be lost.

OPA '90 provides us a great example of how we can both raise the standard without creating economic displacement in the industry. We have seen tremendous growth in the industry of transporting oil over the last 25 years, or 20 years, and it's very important that we use the

same sort of transition model going forward so that we don't have an abrupt, elongated stop of activity.

OMSA is committed to a safe Gulf. We applaud the creation of the Marine Well Containment Corporation. This effort shows great promise. As soon as the Coast Guard modernizes its vessel construction regulations, which Gary described so well, OMSA members are ready to meet the design, construction, manning challenges to create a new level of safety in the Gulf with OSRVs that are clearly meeting world standards. It's frustrating to know that a regulatory regime is an impediment to innovation. We are committed to working with larger offshore industry and regulators to improve response technology. But in our instance, time is the enemy. The longer we wait, the more vessels

will be displaced.

OMSA is committed to working with BOEM and we'd like to ask for the opportunity to join the Joint Industry Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Task Force. Some of our members have been consulted, but I think there may be a more formal role for our association members to play.

And finally, we ask that deepwater drilling

resume as quickly as possible. We have jobs and lives at stake that you've heard a great deal of testimony on over the last eight weeks, and we appreciate your being down here to listen. But there are so many companies that are on the cusp. There's articles in the New York Times, Times-Pic articles that suggested the moratorium hasn't been as bad as expected. It's been pain deferred, but there's no question that the pain will come. Jobs are lost and assets are going to be lost to the Gulf unless we understand what -- a smooth transition. What we're looking for is market clarity so business decisions can be made.

Thank you very much.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Thank you very much. Appreciate it. Dr. Davis.

DR. DAVIS: Well, in interest of full disclosure, I'm an academician. I've been asked to encapsulate Louisiana's oil spill research and development program in the context of the State of Louisiana. In order to give that, I have to give you a brief history.

I am going to summarize sixteen years of oil spill research at the state level. And to do that, I want to remind you that we have been in

the oil and gas business in Louisiana for over 100 years. We're still counting. We have gone from the marshlands to the northeastern corner and northwestern corner of the state.

It has been reported that the first over-water well in North America was done in Louisiana. It's actually the second. We were only nine months after discovery of the Spindletop Field. We did, in fact, go up into Caddo Lake. From Caddo Lake, we moved to the marshlands. It was indeed a challenge to go from, in essence, a upland swamp to an area that can't make up its mind if it's land or water. In doing that, we gave birth of what we call the wetlands industry. But in order to do that, we had to develop the necessary infrastructure.

You've heard today from one of the leaders in offshore industry, and that's Edison Chouest. But well before we coined the term "Brown Water Navy" for the Vietnamese, we had individuals who, in South Louisiana, we would say "their back name," you might say their surname, Candies, Theriot, Argeron, Cheramie. These are the people that set the stage followed by the Chouest family.

That being said, Louisiana became the

nation's boiler room. We became the economic mainstay of oil and gas, and as a result, when you look at a map of Louisiana, we're the only state in the union that produces oil and/or national gas in every parish. You would call it a county. Oklahoma has all but one.

And with that as a background, we know the oil and gas business well. After all, we were the state that pioneered offshore drilling. We were the state that introduced it in 1947 and pushed the boundaries to the Deepwater Horizon incident, if you like. Consequently, we've been in the business for more than 100 years, and the Gulf of Mexico is simply an extension of the oil and gas province found throughout Coastal Louisiana.

Your own records will show you that in terms of platforms, there's approximately 3800 with about sixty-plus thousand wells. What most people don't understand is, less than 100 of those structures are not off the Coast of Louisiana. We are, indeed, the leaders, and these gentlemen speak highly of what needs to be done.

And, of course, we're going to continue to expand. You can't expand with a moratorium. Enough said. That being said, however, the State

has created what was called the Louisiana Applied and Educational Oil Spill Research and Development

Program. Like the military, it has an acronym, OSRADP.

This is a record of all spills in Louisiana. As we break it down, we can look from offshore or just offshore over ten barrels, which was required. Now, there's some difference. We can look at the pipelines. And if we look at the academic awards, we have given out 139 awards in support of about 100 projects. The recent numbers don't agree, as some of these were two and three years; therefore, they were counted more than once. And the academic institutions include all public and private, with LSU getting about 51 percent of the awards.

Been in business since 1993. We used about $6,000,000. We had a budget of $500,000 a year for research. We were able to leverage that with an average award of $43,000.

That being said, if this will work, these are just some examples. I don't ask you to memorize this, but I would like for you to note that we've been involved in Landsat Thematic Mapper information on how we determine our coastline. By

way of a footnote, Director, we're also losing the largest amount of land in the coterminous United States. By statistics, we lose about one acre ever thirty minutes. So we've had a potential impact in how we deal with used oil.

Because we have a facility where we have the permits necessary to burn, we got involved with

NIST, National Institute of Science and Technology. Using that science and technology, we burn the marsh. Internal core temperatures reach just short of 3000 C. As long as we've got two centimeters of water, we will not burn the ribosomes. It's an effective technique that we can use in Coastal Louisiana's near-sea-level marshes.

With sustained winds exceeding 155 miles an hour, offshore waves were at one time perceived by NOAA and your former office that there were rogue waves at 80 to 100 feet. We now know that that's not a rogue situation. Information from Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike has proven that.

We know we have to deal with oil spills. We learned from the EXXON VALDEZ incident. As a result of more than 500 spills associated with hurricanes in 2005, 2008, we began to initiate an

aggressive burn policy which Federal regulators had no clue whether it would work. There was a great deal of nervousness. We burned the marsh and it recovered quickly. The biggest problem now are the feral hogs.

So when we look at this, we used ammoniated bagasse as a product to clean up the wetlands. We actually developed that technology. We've looked at phytoremediation. We looked at ocean atmospheric conditions from the Mississippi Delta as that affects the loop current offshore. The Earth Scan Laboratory has become very active in

monitoring offshore weather conditions. That becomes critical in any wave height situation as we look into all wells offshore.

In addition, we have surveyed Louisiana seabird colonies. We've had factors controlling wetlands recovery after in-situ burning. And the background in Louisiana seabirds, we're at the end of the North American flyway, depending on the years, but we're looking at multi-millions of birds. By having an assessment of the rookeries, we know better where to protect these rookeries and reduce the NERDA (phonetic) costs associated with recovery. So we went into the seabird colony

assessment. We were quite successful. The problem is this whole database needs to be updated.

The geographic information systems have been critical in any assessment of coastal processes. That being said, we began to develop a highly aggressive GIS database.

Mr. Director, I can tell you right now that Louisiana is the only state in the union that has six-inches, high-resolution satellite information on all of the coast south of the interstate system. We are aggressive in looking how we can use GIS to better meet our response capabilities.

Continuing this somewhat short list of the kind of projects that we've been involved in, one of the things we looked at was wave-current online information systems. The purpose of that became

highly critical during Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, Ike. Clearly these events were catastrophic in the nearshore as well as offshore. Wave height became very significant. Katrina was not only a lesson to the City of New Orleans, to FEMA, but it was also a lesson of what takes place in the Gulf of Mexico.

With that as the background, we began to look

at wave height and developed a system using a radar device that measures wave height. But we are a state that produces oil and natural gas in every parish; therefore, we're not simply looking at the marshes. We have to be aware of swamps. We had a gasoline leak in the swamps when we were carrying the torch to Atlanta. Needless to say, the torch had to redirected. We also have to deal in upland pine forests and we have a pipeline infrastructure that's old.

Mr. Director, I hope you're aware there are pipelines that are in this country that are 100 years old and need to be looked at carefully. We do not have a master database, even the one that was in your predecessor, that's absolutely correct, yet we have the capabilities.

That is an area that we are concerned about, so we produced a GIS. This GIS was distributed to every oil and gas company that works in Louisiana as a free product, and we have put it in all midland senior high schools as a way to get students involved.

The data now is over 130 various kinds of information from highly detailed oil and gas records. You can click on any dot and get all the

information you need about the individual operator, to looking at places that -- this is not Port Fourchon, but it's just south of it on Belle Pass. We can actually go in and do a picture of a cut and tell you precisely how much boom you would need at that cut. And then we can go into other kinds of techniques. We can get some idea of 1250 feet of boom. We can look at a great deal of ancillary information, particularly in the nearshore. When you do these proximity models, you want some idea of the various kinds of area that you would have to protect. That can be done.

And when you work in Louisiana, you have to have access to marinas. We've got a master database with 1350 marinas in it and that's so -- whoever has the evergreen contract may not work or live in Louisiana. They know, and the people here in the boat business will tell you, in shallow water, you don't want to take out the bottom half of your boat. So these are highly detailed and we're in the process of updating those.

We can do the same thing with pipelines. Pipelines are a very critical area. I know we're talking about oil spills, but I think there's a pipeline that broke San Bruno, California in which

over a hundred houses are burning as we speak. Pipelines are an issue we have to be concerned with. They are the backbone of our infrastructure in terms of meeting our hydrocarbon needs in the Middle West.

So as we continue going through this list, if you will, the bottom one notes that we were involved in the development of a pipeline GIS. I think it's important that you understand that the original as-builts do not exist, so you have to go and look at the witness posts. From the witness posts, you reconnect the dots, if you will. Highly intensive field work, very detailed GIS work. We've looked at in-situ light scanning fluorescent devices. We've looked at how we can better assess pipelines.

This is one pipeline corridor. You'll note one, two, three, four, five, six, seven pipelines in an area that is about fifty yards wide. And then we make these available to, generally, Homeland Security. We try to keep a record of all the pipeline companies.

I can tell you, Mr. Director, that we have done field work and had to change the pipeline ownership three times in one year. There are

always questions and concerns. I didn't make up this. This is true fact.

And, of course, in Louisiana, we would understand an alligator is just an alligator.

Training and research in blowout prevention. Development of an oil/brine spill restoration plan. We now use LIDAR, light detecting and ranging, to get better assessment of elevations. LIDAR has numerous advantages in the spill response community. Nitrogen recycling in oil/brine contaminated area. We developed a hydrodynamic model with input from NOAA that allows us to see how oil or water would move from the Sabine to the Calcasieu Lake, particularly if you think of the hydrocarbons moving through the Sabine system and the Calcasieu Lake system --

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: I thought you said this was a short list. It keeps going.

DR. DAVIS: Incidentally, I've got two minutes and I'm going to make it.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Okay. Go ahead.

DR. DAVIS: All right. The point is, I am purposely overwhelming your senses. In your corner office you may not ever get another chance, so I was asked to do it. I have academic license

and I'm retired.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Fair enough.

DR. DAVIS: In order to look at marsh capability to withstand oil, in some cases the best thing to do is don't do anything. It's a hydrocarbon. The plants will take up this and that functioned very well.

We also have to be aware of shoreline segments to better understand how we can clean this up. All of this is on DVD. I have copies if you're interested. We have looked at all kinds of satellite imagery to best respond to situations, what kind of situations. If Ed Owens was sitting in this chair, this is precisely the thing he would tell you. These are the things that allow the field responders to better assess how they're going to clean up individual segments of coastline. So the more of this information we can put in your hands, the better you can become in the spill response business. And that's all we're doing here, is giving clues to the people that make the decisions.

Well, in summary, all of this material is good, but on the shelf it's useless. It has to be put into the hands of the people that make the

decisions. It's a constant reminder. We are always in need of more information. We need more data. We have to be prepared. In addition, in short, our program is in the business to do business.

By footnote, we worked with Louisiana Sea Grant agents. We asked them to go through some training nine months ago in case we had a spill, and they became the ombudsmen for the people involved in this event.

Director, they speak French. They speak Vietnamese. Their mommas and daddies were in the

oil spill business. The fishermen trust them, and therefore the Louisiana Sea Grant program became the de facto information supply line.

As we look at the future in oil spill research, I think it can be summarized into four categories. Equipment, clearly defined by these gentlemen to my right, and the one to my left soon. Safety issues. In the case of Louisiana restoration, rehabilitation. And the one that's long been overlooked is the socioeconomic costs associated with a single spill event. So, in summary, thank you.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Thank you very much,

Dr. Davis, and we would love to have your DVD. So thanks so much. Mr. Costner.

MR. COSTNER: Thanks, Professor. I've been thinking about that pig for a while. There are casualties.

Director Bromwich, thank you for inviting me. I feel honored to be sitting here today with my fellow panelists in addressing what is a very critical issue facing this nation: Our capability to protect our environment and to put into place a credible oil spill response plan.

We are all aware of the major task ahead of this panel and the Department of the Interior. But I also believe that America's challenge at this moment can also become its opportunity to chart a new course that can put us in the forefront of oil spill clean-up. I believe that

Gulf residents and the rest of the American people were underwhelmed by the response they saw after the BP Deepwater Horizon spill. They were underwhelmed because after EXXON VALDEZ, the Federal Government took swift action to strengthen our oil spill research and to focus this nation's resources on advancing our oil spill response technology. That was 1990. So what has happened

since then?

Is it possible that nothing really has changed? That 20 years was wasted? The whole world has watched in awe as the United States once again fumbled its way through the biggest environmental disaster in history.

It is easy to be mad at the oil industry, to be mad at British Petroleum. I don't know who you're mad at, but I am mad at myself. I am mad that I saw this coming and I was unable to alter its inevitable outcome. I am mad that I didn't stand up taller, that I didn't talk louder. I was reluctant to use my celebrity because I thought the need was obvious and that the technology that I had developed would speak for itself. But I was wrong.

But thanks to our system of government and this panel, I have a second chance to make this right, to be heard, to let people here and around the world know that it doesn't have to play out like this, that there is a solution and a choice to be made. That is why I am here today to

present Blue Plant Solutions' Gulf Coastal Response Plan.

America needs to demand that the same

appetite, the same energy that drives this industry around the world in pursuit of oil, where no cost seems too great, should be willing to use that same mind-set, the same financial resources to address the safety of the American people and an ecosystem that cannot speak for itself.

Blue Plant Solutions came to the Gulf after the Deepwater Horizon with fresh ideas and sought out local partners in the Gulf. The plan we have developed and putting forth today is based on lifelong industry experiences by men who have built, grown, and operate oil field support companies that are nationally and internationally recognized. Tempered with their good judgment, this plan is not only adequate but overwhelming in its response capabilities.

This plan was strategically formed to take advantage of existing assets that are currently working in the Gulf. Our plan is three-tiered. It consists of a first response, followed by an overwhelming response, backed up by a shallow water last line of defense. It will consist of 190 vessels, 40 platform -- deepwater platform service vessels, 30 offshore supply vessels, 10 deepwater barges, 100 shallow water skimmers, and

10 shallow water barges. They will incorporate state-of-the-art booming, skimming, separation, and storage capacity.

What you see now is a graphic of the 33 deepwater rigs. These deepwater rigs are serviced at any point in time by 40 deepwater platform supply vessels that are operating throughout the Gulf on a 24-hour basis. Our plan includes these assets and will retrofit them with state-of-the-art oil spill recovery technology. They will have a storage capacity of approximately 12,000 barrels.

Should an accident occur like the Deepwater Horizon, we would be able to deploy six of these vessels to the accident site within two or three hours. An overwhelming response will follow in the form of 30 offshore supply vessels that will go to land and put skids on top of them. It will also be followed by 10 deepwater barges and will be deployed within 48 hours.

For purposes of this graphic, however, we have just sent six platform vessels along with two deepwater barges, giving the storage capacity at this particular well of over 300,000 barrels. If this was the Deepwater Horizon and we decided to

throw the kitchen sink at it, we would have the ability to have 1.5 million barrels of oil of

storage. The Deepwater Horizon -- our plan to deal with the Deepwater Horizon would have incorporated 190 vessels versus the 6000 we saw deployed this summer.

It is also important for the panel to understand that Blue Plant Solutions' plan does not consider the Deepwater Horizon a worst-case scenario. Given the dangerous world that we live, we have anticipated a situation where five Deepwater Horizons could occur.

In this case, our comprehensive plan would handle the situation by deploying our 70 offshore vessels and 10 deepwater barges to the multiple spill sites. We would follow this up with a last line of defense that is made up of 10 shallow water barges and 100 shallow water skimming vessels, which would be equipped with state-of-the-art booming, skimming, and separation technology. They would be located all along the Gulf of New Mexico.

They are designed to work as -- they are designed to work in water as shallow as two feet; and travel up to 20 knots with the ability to work

in seas up to six feet. They range in size from 35 feet to 56 and are designed specifically to be transported by trucks along the Gulf anywhere they would be needed.

These 33 deepwater rigs are how Americans and the rest of the world have come to picture the Gulf, but they do not paint a complete picture of

the Gulf. These yellow dots represent over 5000 platforms that exist in the Gulf right now. In addition, to the 5000 platforms, there are also over 27,000 wells throughout the Gulf with over 7000 of them currently classified as active. Sitting on the ocean floor out of sight is an infrastructure, a network, if you will, of pipelines that stretch over 31,000 miles connecting oil and gas to our main land.

This is a clear picture. This is the correct picture of assets that exist in the Gulf of Mexico and the danger they pose should there be an accident, manmade or otherwise. This is what our end of the Gulf looks like to our neighbors who share our waters.

What do we see when we reverse the picture? I can tell you when we look at their coast, the Gulf is clearly under siege and begs the question:

How good is their plan to cleanup a spill? Do they even have one?

We cannot control what our neighbors do, but we can control how we choose to invest in the safety of our people, our resources, as well as our neighbors -- as well as our international neighbors.

Is it possible that we think the Gulf is so big that what happens somewhere else doesn't matter, that it is not our problem? Are we arrogant enough to think that what happens in those territorial waters couldn't possibly affect

us?

I have heard the argument and if distance allows those who make it to sleep, then I would ask them to look at Cuba. For as beautiful as it is, Cuba still sits approximately 90 miles off the Coast of Florida. Seven deepwater wells have been slated for 2011 and 2012. The countries who have signed up to drill are Venezuela, India, China, Norway, Vietnam, Brazil, Malaysia, and Spain. Twenty-nine out of the 59 areas designated for drilling are currently leased. What will be their response plan? Is it too big a leap to think that something could go wrong on the level of the

Deepwater Horizon and oil could be moving uncontrollably towards Florida and up the Eastern Seaboard?

How can anyone now think when looking at the Gulf that our plan is too ambitious; that our plan is overkill; that we don't need that much capability or capacity?

I would suggest just the opposite; that our plan is too light; that it doesn't incorporate an immediate response boat that should be positioned 24/7 while a well is being drilled with a first responsibility of that to save lives; the second to fight fires; and the third to recover oil.

The bar of protection has been too low for too long. "Adequate" is the word industry chooses to use to protect us rather than "overwhelming." The choices are clear. We can choose to enlist a

fleet of 6000 vessels or we can create a fleet of our own of dedicated ships, 190 state-of-the-art vessels. We can choose to let oil come the surface and corral it, or we can choose to burn it. We can choose to separate oil from water at high speeds with outputs that exceed current EPA standards and improve the efficiency of every boat on the water, or we can use dispersants and sink

it to the bottom. We can choose to recover oil or we can choose to cover it up.

The opportunity today is to move forward. We have a choice in all things, but what we cannot accept is a return to the status quo. Our prayer is that this panel protect us. America deserves a no-nonsense approach to spills that are certain to happen now and into the future. We believe this plan strikes to the heart of the problem. It is efficient, it's streamlined, and robust. It is easy to understand. It is an overwhelming response that brings us immediately into the 21st century. It stands as a turnkey operation that can be implemented today. The American people and the Gulf deserve nothing less. Thank you.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Thank you very much for your presentation. What we'll do now is we'll ask questions of the presenters starting with Mr. Rook. All three of us will ask our questions, then we'll move to the next presenter.

Let me start. Mr. Rook, among the many compelling points you made was the need for a

24-hour skimming operation. Your assertion was that it only -- skimming only took place for approximately 12 hours in dealing with Deepwater

Horizon and it needs to be 24 hour. What is the impediment -- what was the impediment to having a 24-hour skimming operation this time around, as you understand it?

MR. ROOK: Command said, When the sun goes down, you can't skim anymore. I would assume that their reason was that they were afraid that the many vessels out there working in the dark would possibly run into each other or have a problem with booms out, or whatever. I really don't know. They didn't tell us why.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: So it was never made clear to you?

MR. ROOK: No.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: I think this bleeds into the second point I was going to ask you about, is the need for more organization of the skimming capabilities. Can you elaborate a little bit on what you saw as the lack of full organization of those activities?

MR. ROOK: Well, I think that the slide that I put up of the aerial view that had the six different configurations in it is a good example. Essentially, you have a skimming unit that is out there, you know, that's told to go to a certain

area and skim. And you need to have some type of an area or a group command that is going to say, Okay, well, you know, you might be six people in this area, but you have a certain goal or regime that you need to following in doing this.

And the plan that we proposed in having the DP overall control is your skimming vessel -- master of the skimming vessel would have the overall control of each one of those configurations and we would see that he would be provided with formation from aerials or...One thing that we feel is important or should be allowed is the use of UAVs in skimming because currently they won't allow you to do it. But I mean, that's a very, very good opportunity to get accurate data and information on where the oil is.

I mean, you can be in machine oil and, you know, it's there. But, I mean, you can skim all day and you're not going to get anything. I mean, you need to get into the thick oil to be able to make some progress, and that depends on overflights or aerial pictures, or whatever. UAVs flying off of these vessels is a wonderful way to do that, and relatively cheap, too.

So, you know, we feel that's another thing

that should be -- should be incorporated into the plan, a vessel that can have the ability to fly

those from it.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Thanks, Gary. The last point I have is actually not a question; it's a request. I think you know that within the last ten days or so, BP has issued a lengthy report on lessons learned from both spill containment and spill response. We have a lot of expertise on this panel about spill response with some fairly detailed specific knowledge about this particular spill response. So I would invite all of the members of this panel to submit to me and to my agency your comments, reactions, and so forth on the BP's document that is the lessons learned because you may think those lessons learned -- that there aren't enough lessons learned or in that document some of the wrong lessons are put forward. That shouldn't be the one authoritative document out there that addresses these important issues. I think it should have abundant comment from people who were involved and who know quite a bit about it.

So those of you who were directly involved in that or have comments generally, even if you

weren't directly involved, we'd very much appreciate your comments on the reports that BP submitted to me. Thank you. Lars.

MR. HERBST: Yes. Mr. Rook, just a couple quick questions, I think. First of all, I enjoyed the slide presentation. It was very thorough on spill response. Some of your slides, I think,

pointed to -- one of the facts that were brought up was the inefficiency of skimmers as they're used now. One of those, I believe, was the not actually getting the skimmers in the oil, and I guess this is a follow-up question.

How, in your mind, do we improve on that? You mentioned the radar is one option. If you could address that, the technology where that stands right now, and also, again, in the aerial observation and putting skimmers on the oil, if you could address that.

MR. ROOK: Yes, there are radars that are now available that can detect oil. And basically the principle is that oil is going to dampen the wave surface, wave profile, and that's what they read, the dampened area, so it puts you into the oil.

Now, as far as determining the thickness, there are also means to detect thickness by laser

and infrared. Generally, they can be effective out to about 5 to 900 hundred meters away from the vessel, so you can get a fairly good reading on where the thick oil is so you know where you need to go. Again, this is -- this technology is relatively new. It's now -- there have been several -- several of the radars and the thickness -- thickness devices that have been accepted by NOFO, the Norwegian Clean Seas Association, as being acceptable to them. So they have done very thorough testing on them. The UAVs, again, we feel is a very strong way to do this.

MR. HERBST: Also, your experience in this response and maybe lessons learned, is there anything that you could speak to, especially in the deepwater response, not so much the shallow, but as far as the effectiveness of skimmer equipment? We've heard things about Transvac skimmer heads, weir skimmers. Was there one that was more effective in your mind in deepwater than another?

MR. ROOK: Well, we -- the two vessels that we -- that we outfitted, we used the Transvac 150 skimmers which were the new technology. I believe the MSRC vessels that Mr. Dane had built after the

VALDEZ, they also have the Transvac 150s on them, as well, much older technology. The newer ones are much more capable. Those particular skimmers are capable of up to 400 meters cubed a day, which is about 30,000-barrel capacity -- well, no, about 60,000 per day. But that's capacity; that's not reality.

You know, that was one of the things here that we saw. You know, reality is how much you really get; not capacity, what you could possibly get. And I believe that the Director actually mentioned that in his opening statement, that the rating system is somewhat incorrect.

I think the one statement was that there was greater than 1.2 million barrel recovery capability per day at the mid part of this. Well, if that's the case, in five days you should have

had it all. But it just doesn't work that way.

You know, I think that if you get -- you know, in talking with -- I did a good bit of speaking to the NOFO people on this because we feel they're pretty good on this stuff and have got a good plan. And, you know, 20 percent of recovery is what they're saying would be very good. You're not going to get it all.

MR. HERBST: Thank you.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Mr. Hauser.

MR. HAUSER: I have a follow-up question concerning the 24-hour skimming, skimming at night. What technology advances do we need to have the capability to effectively skim at night?

MR. ROOK: Well, again, I would say I think that they're there now. I think they just need to be employed on our vessels. I'm not going to say they weren't there ten years ago, and they certainly wasn't there when, you know, the initial fleet was -- the MSRC and NRC and those vessels were developed, that technology wasn't there. But it is. I mean, one point that I would certainly bring up here is that, you know, we fix -- we can fix it for now using the technology that's now available, but that's got to continually be upgraded. You can't just let it sit there. Technology changes every year, you know, every day. I mean, look at your computer. I mean, the computer you had a year ago is well obsolete now. The same with your cell phone, and it's no

different in these other -- this other technology. You have to be able to upgrade and keep that equipment top of the line with the new

enhancements.

For example, the TR 150s on MSRC vessels are 20-year-old units. They're not nearly as capable as the TR 150s that are in current production. So at some point you have to say, Okay, well, you know, we're going to have to get rid of these and get some new stuff on it. It may be the same name, same manufacturer, but it's not the same unit. There needs to be some method of keeping your equipment current and as effective as possible.

MR. HAUSER: Thank you.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Mr. Dane, I have one question for you, and it's based on your discussion of funding sources, and specifically the potential for integration with the MWCC, the entity that the four majors are creating. That was announced obviously with substantial fanfare a couple of months ago, and it does seem like a very good and, frankly, pretty bold start.

What I don't know and don't understand, and maybe you can help me with, is the extent to which companies outside the Big Four, including your company and others, are going to be included in this, if you know.

Have you had any contact with the people who are responsible for forming the MWCC to find out about potential ways of integrating your capabilities with what they're planning to do?

MR. DANE: I personally have not had direct contact. We're working with some people we know. Chouest and other people have had it. But again, just like Mr. Costner's Blue Planet plan, we're the last resort in terms of the shallow water we're looking at. And when I read the Marine Containment Plan, I mean, so much of their investment is underwater investment and well-related investment versus clean-up investment.

And that was my question, is what part of the billion would go to the assets that would be available on standby to help clean up. I mean, we've got -- you'll hear from our politicians this morning on where were the assets. Everybody was saying, you know, we're worried about oil coming, and we had no kind of fire station of these inland skimmers as the last resort ready to go. They just did not have enough assets along the coast from Mississippi to Alabama and Florida to do that.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Lars.

MR. HERBST: Just A follow-up question to that. I guess, much has been brought to bear on

this accident since the start of it as far as capacity, especially some of the shallow water skimmers. From your understanding, is that equipment still available for future use, or what's your understanding of the status?

MR. DANE: Well, we built -- we had a contract as a subcontract to Marco for ten DP skimmers. And then when they capped the well July 15th, they said, We will take whatever you can deliver by the end of August. So our ten-boat contract got cut to six boats.

We do know at the end of the day, there was not the recoverable oil in the shallow waters enough to even put those boats in service, and some of our boats went immediately to a storage yard in Memphis. So they are starting to store them. But then again, a lot of what we saw was these vessels of opportunity. As Mr. Rook showed, just -- they can drag a boom, but what are they going to do with it? And yet, there's just not that capability. A lot of shrimp boats out there, which are great for shrimping, but they're terrible because they don't have the storage

capacity for oil.

And what we see is just the lack -- we were very fortunate here in Mississippi. We didn't get a lot of oil because we didn't have that many boats available to really skim and pick up oil had it hit the Mississippi shores. We were more fortunate than Louisiana.

MR. HERBST: And another question. If we took Mr. Costner's blueprint for an oil spill response plan, as a shipyard owner and builder, do you believe the capacity is there to build that plan out as far as the number of vessels needed in a short period of time?

MR. DANE: We built 17 vessels just in a hundred days. We were working two shifts, seven days a week because of the necessity for the response. But we were only using a small portion of our shipyard. I mean, Trinity could build, certainly, the hundred vessels and the shallow water fleet that we're looking at in less than a year.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Jim, you talked a lot about the dual challenge of regulatory clarity, and yet making sure that people get back to work. I just wanted to comment on that rather than

really ask you a question.

That's what we're striving for. I think you know that the purpose of these forums is to gather information for me to bring back to Secretary Salazar so he can make the decisions about whether and in what ways to shorten the moratorium.

I think you're well aware, as I think most members of this panel are, about the regulatory steps that have already been taken in terms of NTL-5 that relates to safety; NTL-6 that relates to certain environmental issues, including worst-case discharge. And I think it's known that

we are going to be taking other steps to raise the bar in terms of regulatory requirements.

And so, what the resumption of work will depend on, obviously, is how quickly industry is able to respond to and incorporate the new requirements that are going to come out.

And I think what those are are fairly clear, and I would hope that industry has looked at the 30-Day Safety Report to the President on May 27th, together with the proposed SIMS Rule, which was originally issued about a year ago. We've said -- I've said repeatedly that those two major regulatory steps are going to be issued very

likely by the end of this month, and so I hope that the requirements that are in those various documents are being paid close attention to by industry and that they are working right now to incorporate the additional safeguards and requirements that are in those documents, so that as soon as the moratorium is lifted, they are ready to go.

I think I've also said that some of the more onerous requirements that were in the 30-day report with respect retrofitting, blowout preventers, and so forth, are not going to be immediate requirements, that they're going to go through a conventional notice and comment rulemaking in part -- in large part because we realize that requiring their immediate implementation would, in effect, be an extension

of the drilling moratorium.

So we're trying to be as clear as we can. If there are issues associated either with the draft SIMS Rule, which you have, or the various other non-BOP requirements that are in -- that were in the 30-day report and that are going to be incorporated in the interim final rule, we would love to know what those are sooner rather than

later, because short of actually showing the rule now, which the process doesn't permit, we think we've telegraphed in great detail what the additional requirements are going to be.

So I hope the message has been clear in the past. If not, I hope I'm making it clear now because we are in the process of doing both of the things that you've talked about, which is raising the regulatory bar, which I think everybody acknowledges is critically important, but at the same time, not having that be a bar for having industry return to work once the moratorium is lifted. Lars.

MR. HERBST: Just a couple of questions. I believe I heard you say, Jim, that OMSA would support the waiver of the Jones Act in similar situations as the Horizon incident; is that correct?

MR. ADAMS: Yes, if there was a need for a foreign flag vessel to respond to an oil spill, we would. Temporarily, it would be a waiver. But that's just reasonable. I think the important

thing to recognize is, despite some of the popular media over the summer, there was a lot of misinformation cast on the Jones Act as an

obstruction to response that we saw. And, in fact, it's just not -- not true. As the photo that I displayed demonstrated, you had foreign flag and U.S. flag vessels working side by side, and you had Admiral Allen state that waivers were not an issue.

So, I don't mean to -- to clarify, necessarily, the record for your agency, but rather for the public. There was a lot of misun- -- misinformation portrayed by third parties, I believe.

MR. HERBST: And to follow that up, obviously, some of the vessels that were needed as far as containment-type vessels later in the response, dynamic-position tankers, I believe there was one that was a U.S -- U.S. flag, but two others came from overseas. I believe one UK, one Norway.

Do you see any change in the U.S. shipbuilding, especially for large vessels, where those vessels could be built here in the U.S.?

MR. ADAMS: I might ask my members and colleagues on the panel to comment on that. Their expertise on shipbuilding exceeds mine.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Want to take a crack at

it, anybody?

MR. ROOK: Well, we certainly could build and we'd be more than happy to. I think we've had some discussions with some of the oil companies about Jones Act tankers. But we have the facilities to do it and the people to do it, and we're ready to get started any time.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Thank you. One question I do have for you, Jim. You mentioned towards the end of your presentation something that suggested that the Joint Industry Task Forces, which we actually heard from earlier in the week in Houston, may not have been as open to members of your trade association or others as I had previously thought. Have there been bars to your participating in that process; and if so, do you understand what the reasons for those bars are?

MR. ADAMS: No, I don't know that there's been a bar established. What I would suggest is the expertise that resides within OMSA ought to be part of the Joint Task Force.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Have you offered it up? I guess that's my question.

MR. ADAMS: Yes.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: And so far that offer has

not been accepted?

MR. ADAMS: Well, the offer -- there was

leadership transition within OMSA in the past couple of months and we are going to request the opportunity to become more formally active in that group.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Yeah, I would suggest that you do that. It's obviously a very substantial effort. There are a lot of companies involved in it. We heard from the heads of the four separate task forces in Houston earlier this week, so the more widespread the participation is by industry, the better. It's obviously not going to be the last word. We're looking for others to comment on that. We're looking for as broad a participation by as large a variety of groups as possible, but certainly your trade association has members that have expertise that I think can contribute to that effort.

MR. ADAMS: Thank you. Also, may I say, I appreciate very much your response to my presentation. The clarity you provided just this morning is very helpful and appreciated. But as you can imagine, we're not the direct regulated community, rather we are the service providers to

them. And so, in many cases, until our members understand that the regulated -- the directly regulated community is moving ahead with business plans, we will feel extremely uneasy about the business environment that is with us.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: No, I completely understand that, and your observation simply gave

me an opportunity to try to make clear what some people may be confused about, so I appreciate it.

MR. ADAMS: Thank you, and I do appreciate it.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Dr. Davis, one, really, question flows out of your presentation. You've really shown us -- as you said, it was information overload -- but a wide variety of all sorts that have been funded. Is there enough focus in the funding? It seems like there were so many different studies cutting across such a wide range of related issues. One thought that popped into my head is, is there enough focus, or is this just so disaggregated that it may not be as fully useful as it might otherwise be?

DR. DAVIS: The question about focus is certainly a good one. But at the same time, when you're dealing with geologic environments that go

from the border of Arkansas to the Gulf of Mexico, from the Sabine to the Pearl, and you have to show interest in all of those environments, we had to be careful. And so, we did have an open call, because when you deal with the public colleges and universities, you have no idea what their expertise. And just like employees in the Federal Government, they change. Academicians change. The people that I may know do metallurgical work at Louisiana Tech, particularly on pipelines, if they get offered a better job at the University of Missouri, we've lost that scientist.

So we had to structure a statewide program open to all 19 public colleges and universities for political goodwill, and work on the expertise available at those universities. Now, if there's a common thread in terms of focus, it's always been around GIS, as well as using radar. And that's been a common focus because we understand how vulnerable our near-sea-level marshes are.

And then appended to do that has been a great deal of concern about resiliency of marsh plants. Remember, our marsh plants are divided into four categories. We have saline, intermediate, then we go on into fresh, and there's a transition zone.

Each marsh community responds different to oil in cases. And we're not just dealing with oil that comes from offshore rigs. They will have API numbers that are much different.

So the short answer is, no, we do not have a focus.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Thank you. Lars.

MR. HERBST: Just one -- one main question. I think your presentation was very, very thorough. But the question is, as we move forward as a Bureau in evaluating oil spill contingency response plans, there was some question in this response as to identified, critical environmental-sensitive assets that need to be protected. Some of this may have gotten mixed up with what may have been economic critical assets, say a beach versus a marsh, or tourism versus a marine

ecosystem for fish, shrimp, crabs, whatever.

Do you believe that the status of these contingency plans are where they need to be, or is that a critical step that needs to be looked at?

DR. DAVIS: I think it's a critical step because, particularly in Louisiana, our marshes change so dramatically that the number you used last year is incorrect this year. So to use a

common expression, it's a moving target. And those of us that live and work in there understand that. And one reason we're so committed to using satellite imagery, it's a way we can keep abreast of the changes, and now we're looking at six-inch resolution. It just makes it easier in the response to drop the science in place to allow the responders to adequately address the issues.

We have a mud coast. A mud coast has never been addressed adequately by the skimmer community because it's a mud coast. So there are always issues and they will be there because it's a dynamic environment. This is not the coast of California where you stand and look, it's a cliff. I was very sincere when I said we live in an environment that can't make up its mind if it wants to be land or water. I didn't say that just to be humorous. That is a fact.

So the answer is, we're never adequate. I'm sorry. We're just never there.

MR. HERBST: I guess to follow that up, I know you may not be able to speak for the State of

Louisiana, but do you see the State's wanting to provide changes to those environmentally sensitive index areas for booming strategy mainly that --

was something done wrong? Was something protected ahead of something else that needed better protection?

DR. DAVIS: Well, I think you're right. I cannot speak for the State of Louisiana, but I am retired.

MR. HERBST: So you can speak freely.

DR. DAVIS: I can speak for myself. I think that booming strategies are important. They're not insignificant because of the fragility of the wetlands. But it really comes down to skimmers and the science driving those skimmers. You have the capability at onset. We need to expand with these gentlemen.

I can only tell you what I've learned through the historical record. Those are the people on the ground. Those are the people that can give you the information, some of which can be done instantly. But there are environmental situations, that unless you talk to a near-shore oceanographer, they're not going to know, and that's where the dialogue becomes critical.

MR. HERBST: Thank you.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Bill.

MR. HAUSER: Yes. I had a question about

there are many offshore burns as they gathered the oil, and there has been some research done onshore burning some of the marshlands.

DR. DAVIS: Uh-huh.

MR. HAUSER: Has any of that been planned for the marshlands that were impacted by the Deepwater Horizon spill?

DR. DAVIS: You know, I can't say that it's been planned, and the reason is because of the diversity of the environmental communities. Remember, other than the Coast of Florida, Louisiana is the only place in the coterminous United States that has mangroves. So your response in a mangrove oil environment would be different than a phragmites or any other of the marsh grasses.

So it becomes real critical. It's a case-by-case situation. In the case of the Chevron spill that I noted to you, that's a marsh grass that trappers have been burning for 150 years. We knew what was going to happen. We had to convince the regulators, but we really knew what was going to happen. In some cases, Spartina alterniflora, there are some other examples, just leave it alone.

But, you know, from a media perspective and from perception perspective, "You're leaving it

alone?" And yet we know in twelve months...This is not a cold, wet northern environment. It's hot, humid, and has lots of bacteria, and that will work.

So the answer is, case by case, and, yes, we're ready to burn.

MR. HAUSER: Thank you.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Mr. Costner. First of all, thank you very much for coming, I know, a great distance to present your plan, and thank you for playing the role of active public citizen in seeing a major problem and rather than sitting back and wringing your hands, trying to do something very constructive about it. I think that's very unusual, and I appreciate that.

I paid close attention to your thoughtful and compelling presentation. And one feature of it that I don't think has been often remarked on is the risk to us, the oil response threat to us, posed by drilling in other waters. I thought your graphic on what's going on in Cuba is something I had not focused on before, and I think makes it clear and underlines the importance of having

adequate oil spill response, not only for problems that arise in our waters, but that also arise in our neighbors' waters. So I appreciate your sort of broadening our thinking on that.

My question for you is to what extent you have shared this plan with a broader community. I know you've shared it with me. You've shared it

with Secretary Salazar. We're going to be looking at it very closely. Whom else have you shared it with, and can you describe in general terms what the response has been so far?

MR. COSTNER: I have shared it with Secretary of the Navy Mabus; to the Admiral of the Coast Guard, Papp. I'm sorry. I'm using just last names just like these are guys on my team or something, but there's a lot of initials in business and there's a lot of titles that go in front of names.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Yep.

MR. COSTNER: I've presented it to three governors; Haley, and Bobby, and I talked to Rick Perry on the phone and sent them the plan. Two Attorney Generals have looked at this very carefully, Jim Hood of Mississippi, and Buddy Caldwell of Louisiana, who has worked extensively

with us and helped us. I've been -- I've testified twice in Congress and presented, not the plan at that point, because we're just a small piece of the puzzle.

We never wanted to come in like we were the white horse, that we could save, but we certainly -- what we do is, we make all the other pieces of machinery out there efficient. I think that some of the biggest names in this business have brought us in and recognized that. And I feel a lot of gratitude towards them, including BP.

But we have shared this plan with BP. I sat

down with Doug Settles and with Lamar and showed them, along with Gary Chouest, who heads up the Edison Chouest company. We tried to bring industry together to almost kind of do the right thing before you have to ash them, because, you know, this is a mature business. It's a mature industry, and we always want to expect a mature response to something that's gone wrong and the anticipating that something will go wrong.

We continued -- I've shown this plan, I would say, to -- I feel like I'm going to leave some situations out -- but, you know, Senator Landrieu, Mary Cantrell, and Congressman Thompson. And we

developed a strong bipartisan group up on Capitol Hill, having been there twice, because we have -- we have focused on what the problem was and tried to keep our head down, and it hasn't been about celebrity. It has been -- and I appreciate what you said to me. Thank you. It has been -- we have to try to say in a solve mode.

And so this has been presented to a lot of people, and the reception is surprising because the plan is simple. It deals with, you know, in this instance, as a first step, 190 vessels. And it's focused on trying to use assets that are currently working so that it wasn't like a dedicated shiny fleet that's very expensive to build. As you can see, the first 70 boats are actually in operation. We have talked to owners of those assets and they would retrofit these

boats. And we've made a production schedule, and it does kind of map out the course of about two years.

And we have tried to be careful that -- you know, we could have gone very heavy and we elected not to. And I think the people that we have presented the plan to, once they understand it, they actually appreciate that approach, that we

didn't throw the kitchen sink, even though I think we all, in our hearts, feel like the environment deserves it and feel like industry could absorb that and absorb that easily.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Thank you. Lars.

MR. HERBST: Yes. Mr. Costner, just one -- one question. There's -- well, first a comment. I guess there was much technology that was brought to bear on this incident, especially related to spill response, some performed probably miserably, others performed very well, and we learned things. As I worked at the Unified Area Command with Coast Guard and BP, I did hear favorable responses to your centrifuge equipment.

The main question is, Do you foresee some quantitative analysis coming out as far as the effectiveness of the centrifuge in the field? I know it's been tested at OMSA years ago. But as far as true -- true results, quantifiable results of the centrifuge?

MR. COSTNER: We have -- we have that. We have realtime data. We came to the fight very

late. As you know, my struggle has been fifteen years, and we were tested successfully where you said. So the mystery of why it's taken this long,

I think we'll just leave for another panel. Maybe let's not even call that panel. It's a horror story. I don't even like making those movies.

So, I think -- but it was tested in realtime, and it was asked to do things that have never been done on the water. We -- we -- we were able to separate oil concentrations that were as thick as peanut butter. The machine was never intended for that. But because the machine was dedicated for this purpose and this purpose only, it was robust enough to actually handle it.

It took us -- it took us about a week to figure out the engineering, but, again, we were only wanting to separate liquid/liquid, not liquid/solids. It also was then asked to separate dispersed oil, emulsified, and it just -- it was able to separate that. And, of course, it was always able to separate oil and water.

But one of the unique things that we had brought to bear where this is concerned is that we have -- we have challenged ourself, knowing that EPA standards were 15 parts per million, and we took the stance, what if we could get under that. I don't know what's pushing me or burr's under my saddle, but we decided we would make that our own

mandate.

And during the course of separating the three different things that we were asked to separate, we got below five parts per million, and sometimes we got even below undetectable. I wouldn't want to -- I wouldn't want to put that down in the report, although it's there. I wouldn't want to say that we could do that. But we now can safely operate under the current EPA standards of 15 parts per million, and that -- I think that is significant. It's significant for the environment.

So there is realtime data. We came to the fight late, so there's not extensive data, but I think that everyone on this panel who has had an association with the centrifuge understands the efficiency that now boats can fill up with 100 percent oil before coming in; that we can stay out there and work 24 hours; that it can work -- because it's portable, it's able to work on the shallow water barges.

I developed this thing that was six inches tall, about as tall as this glass. When I finished two years later, it stood over eight feet tall and weighed about 4500 pounds. But we didn't

know, different size models and, therefore, that's why our centrifuge is able to fit on Dan's -- on the Trinity boats. It's a very robust, portable piece of machinery.

And truth be told, I developed it also for fresh water because we know our rivers, we know the Great Lakes, we know what's happening when those ships come in to them, and we know that spills don't occur on the ocean. So, I kind of had this plan for a while. I finally got myself associated with some very strong people, some very dynamic partners. There was a moment in time where I was a little bit lost at sea myself.

MR. HERBST: So the report that you mentioned, I'm not familiar with it. Has that been submitted to --

MR. COSTNER: I think it's in a white paper. I think we have -- we not only sent our little sexy plan around, we sent the white report with the heavy lifting, ad we can make sure that that comes to you.

MR. HERBST: Appreciate it.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Bill, any questions?

MR. HAUSER: Just one follow-up question on that. You presented the plan to a number of folks. Has anybody made a commitment or what is their reaction?

MR. COSTNER: I don't want to speak for BP, but I -- they like the plan. They really -- they really like the shallow water version. They like

the idea that we're working with the existing assets. The rub comes with what they think is the absolute number that we need. In their minds, when they looked at our plan, they thought that 15 of the boats, the deepwater vessels that are currently operating out there, would be enough.

I don't feel that because at any one point in time -- you know, we don't think that one scenario is the one scenario to look at. We feel that 40 is the number to start with. And like I said in my report, we think that may be even a little light.

You know, actually, the way you posed the questions back to me, Mr. Director, it made me think about Cuba even more. It's like, are we light, because right now we're talking about the Gulf. We're not talking about the West Coast, we're not talking about the East Coast, and we're

certainly not talking about Alaska. We're talking about the Gulf.

So, you know, I've said to the industry -- because I'm talking with Chevron and Shell today when we leave here. And really what I've asked is that the red-hot spotlight, the white-hot spotlight, if you will, is on them. Let's not do the adequate. That's been -- that's been what's gotten us in trouble. You know, our point was, don't let this be the "Old Man and the Sea," and we submit you a plan that's 190 vessels versus 6000, don't eviscerate this. Don't let this come

back as skeleton and bones. Embrace this plan.

So it has been embraced to a certain extent. The rub comes with what they think is -- is adequate versus what we think is overwhelming. And I would leave that -- I would leave that to you because I know you're in defense of everybody that's not in this room that won't be able to speak and will be able to have to live with the consequences when things go wrong again.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Thank you, and thank all of you for some really fine and thoughtful presentations. We're going to take a fifteen-minute break now, and then we'll resume

with our second and final panel, which is going to be composed of elected officials from the area. Thanks very much.

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(Break in proceedings.)

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DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Why don't we go ahead and begin. This is our second and final panel of the day on offshore drilling, and we're very fortunate to have with us four distinguished elected officials from the surrounding area. Let me go ahead and introduce them starting to my -- closest to me.

I'm pleased to introduce Congressman Gene Taylor, who represents the Fourth Congressional District in Mississippi. Mr. Taylor is currently serving his eleventh term. Before coming --

before becoming a congressman, Congressman Taylor served on the Bay St. Louis City Council from 1981 to 1983, and the Mississippi State Senate from 1983 to 1989. Congressman Taylor was born in New Orleans and earned his Bachelor's Degree from Tulane University in 1976.

Sitting to Congressman Taylor's right is Mayor Connie Moran, who is the Mayor of Ocean

Springs. Mayor Moran grew up in Ocean Springs and was elected Mayor of her hometown in June of 2005. Previously, she was president of Moran Consultants, providing marketing and business development services. She had fifteen years of experience in state and local government, served three years as Director of Jackson County Economic Development until March of 1999. And before that, for five years, she served as managing director of the State of Mississippi's European office based in Frankfurt, Germany, in which capacity she recruited new business and industry to the state on behalf of the Mississippi Development Authority.

Sitting to Mayor Moran's left is Connie Rockco. She is a Harrison County Supervisor currently serving her third term as District Five Supervisor. She is the President of the Harrison County Board of Supervisors, serving her second term as President, and she continues to devote her political career to improving the quality of life for District Five residents, concentrating on

improvements in education, roads, drainage, water and sewer, recreation, economic development, environment, senior services, and planning.

And finally, sitting to Supervisor Rockco's left is Mike Mangum. Mike is a Jackson County Supervisor who works and lives in Pascagoula, Mississippi. He's elected to the Jackson County Board of Supervisors for the 2008 through 2011 term, and became President of the Board in 2010. Prior to serving on the Board of Supervisors, Mr. Mangum participated in the Pascagoula City Council from 1996 to 2007, and served as Mayor Pro Tem from 2002 to 2007. He currently serves on the NACo Oil Spill Task Force roster.

I want to thank all four of you for being here. The format for this is a little different from the fist panel. We'll just listen to your presentations in order, but there will not be a question-and-answer period. So, thank you very much for being here, and we look forward to your presentation.

MR. TAYLOR: I want to thank you for coming to South Mississippi and having this very important hearing. I'm going to try not to repeat what has already been said, but I want to let you know that I'm in agreement with what every one of these panelists said before me.

Number one, there's a number of things that

need to change. But first off is, what was a Korean-built, Marshall Island-flagged, Swiss-owned rig doing operating in America's exclusive economic zone? Quite frankly, there is no excuse why that rig was not U.S. built, United States Coast Guard inspected, and U.S. owned, for every reason you can think of starting with the ten percent unemployment rate, but also the liability. And towards the question, one of the gentlemen asked, do we have the capability to do that, I would remind you that the world's most sophisticated aircraft carriers, submarines and warships are built in America. We can build an oil rig.

Secondly, the nation waited entirely too long to declare it an incident of national significance. My memory is that it was at least eight days from the day of the explosion before the nation said, We're taking over. But the truth be known, even after it was declared an incident of national significance, I found the Coast Guard extremely hesitant to take responsibility. And I don't say this -- I'm a former Coast Guardsman. I don't say that with any malice, but I find myself amazed that people who would gladly sail a ship

into a hurricane were extremity reluctant to tell BP, Go do this or that.

As much as four weeks after the accident I met with the local commander and asked him point blank, Who is in charge, and he did not answer the question. Now, the following Monday, he did, but this is on a Friday at 6:00. He was there with a lady from BP. Neither one of them took responsibility. Neither one said they were in charge four weeks after the incident.

The second thing I'd do is, these local officials were absolutely pounded with requests for help from their constituents' fears, concerns, whatever word you want to use. It took the Coast Guard entirely too long to delegate people of responsibility. My personal friend, Captain Ed Stanton, was in charge of the whole Gulf of Mexico. He should have, from day one, delegated one commander for Alabama, another for Mississippi, another for portions of Louisiana, because the job was so big, the requests were so numerous. So there was a very, very poor job of saying who is in command.

The second thing is command and control. Four weeks after the incident, the Coast Guard

helicopters, and the National Guard aircraft still could not talk to the vessels of opportunity. I remember flying with them one week after the incident and saying -- because, as it was pointed out by the gentleman from Chouest, you had boats going this way, boats going that way. None of them could see the oil. You could spot the oil

from above, but it took four weeks for there to get radios between the vessels of opportunity and the overhead assets.

To your question of why weren't they skimming at night, is observation. I want these gentleman to know that in the aftermath of 9/11, the EPA started a program called ASPECT. It was started up by some ex-CIA guys. The idea was to fly around a weapon of mass destruction, find out what it was, how bad it was, which direction it's going, and how fast it's traveling. It's called the ASPECT program.

These -- the EPA originally came down with that program to monitor the plum of the burns, but discovered that by tweaking their equipment that they could detect -- that they could tell the difference between seaweed and oil. And having flown the spill 20 times, I can tell you that from

as close as 50 feet above, there some days it's almost impossible to tell is that -- is that seaweed; is that oil. In fact, I called up Mr. Dane's outfit one Sunday, got his son out of bed, to go run the skimmer out there and it turned out to be -- pleasantly surprised -- it turned out to be seaweed instead of oil, but it sure looked like -- to everyone on that helicopter, it sure looked like oil.

So you need continuous overhead assets. I would strongly encourage our nation to take that ASPECT program, put it on a geosynchronous

satellite so that you have continuous overhead assets looking. And the reason I think it's important to say continuous is, there was one day when I flew the spill with the Commandant of Coast Guard at 9:00 in the morning; we didn't see any oil. I flew the exact same route at 1:00 that afternoon in a place that's only got about, at max, two-knot currents, and there was oil off of one of our harbors that had literally traveled 110 miles subsurface, got into some sort of a warm-water uplift, and it popped up just off of Long Beach Harbor. So it did happen and certainly can happen again. That's why it's got to be

continuous.

The communication. Command and control. But lastly, I cannot emphasize enough that it's America's exclusive economic zone. Those jobs ought to be going to Americans. I flew, as I mentioned. It's now, what, over a hundred days since the incident? I have not seen the Korean Coast Guard show up. I have not seen the Marshall Islands Coast Guard show up. I haven't seen the Swiss Coast Guard. They made the money. We got stuck with the bills. This ought to be for American jobs for American citizens. Thank you very much.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Thank you very much, Congressman Taylor. We very much appreciate it. Mayor Moran.

MS. MORAN: Thank you very much for being

here in South Mississippi. We appreciate you making the trip and the effort.

I will have to say, from an elected officials' point of view here on the Gulf Coast, our main concern -- and I, of course, share this with Connie Rockco and Mike, and all of the eleven mayors here on the Gulf Coast -- was the incredible lack of communication from the outset

between the incident command, the unified command in Mobile. We had no command here on the Mississippi Coast. It was all located in Mobile with hundreds of Federal and State officials running around, and it just was very uncoordinated.

And, quite frankly, we found that extremely exasperating, to the point where I personally called the Department of Environmental Quality representative of unified command and said, Please, you must come. I will have a meeting here at city hall. I will invite all the mayors and the county supervisors, and just give us a briefing. This happened May 21st, so, literally, a month we had no communication really of what was going on, and we're the people that our constituents looked to for answers. We literally were out of the loop.

So then I contacted the governor's office, and they said that they would help sponsor that, and that meeting did take place then at our Department of Marine Resources in Biloxi. And

they gave us an overview of how the spill response was going on out in the deepwater, and when any oil would approach the islands, they would head it

off at the Pass, like Dog Key Pass between Horn and Deer Island. That's the area of Jackson County and Ocean Springs where we're most vulnerable. We were basically told, Don't really do anything. Even when oil comes up on the beach, we're going to take care of that, too.

They invited the counties and the cities to present a plan of what we would like for equipment and supplies in order to assist on the shore if we had any on-shore impact. All of our cities, we did that, and we did receive some equipment. We also put up fencing barriers along that is a hydrophilic fencing that you might still see while you're down here that would absorb oil, but water would still be able to flow. Our main concern was protection of the marshes, especially how we had seen the Louisiana marshes were so decimated. So, we did get that going, but it was, again, a couple of months or six weeks out.

There was really no idea of what to do. The response effort was laughable. They put up the 18-inch booms, which was nothing more than a speed bump for any real oil response, so a lot of resources spent on that. Also, hundreds of vacuum trucks were brought in and staged in Harrison

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County and in Jackson County waiting to suck up oil out of skimmers. The problem was, there was only one skimmer.

So, the panel this morning, I was very impressed in that we have an absolute inadequate amount of vessels, and that certainly needs to be beefed up. That needs to be coordinated. I was impressed with Mr. Costner's plan. It's simple, it's doable, but certainly we could have a number of vessels in various ports along the Gulf of Mexico for a quick response.

After being told by BP and the State and Federal officials, "Don't worry, we have it all taken care of. We have 4000 vessels of opportunity, just -- we're the Navy, y'all are the militia. Just sit tight." And then out at Horn Island on one weekend -- this is the day after the incident that Congressman Taylor was talking about -- oil came through the Pass, five miles long. It was perfectly calm water. You could have skimmed it up very easily. Not a vessel in sight except a Coast Guard cutter way off on the south side of the islands.

I was absolutely incensed, called unified command, did speak to the BP representative, and

she told me, "Well, Connie, there just aren't any vessels, or they're deployed elsewhere." So all

the promises that were made to us, that did not materialize.

I will say communication did become better as time went on, but that's because we were very aggressive and made sure that we knew who the Coast Guard officials were and the DEQ, and DMR, and BP representatives.

They sent scientists in. We talked about having more significant boom, significant ocean boom that would be manufactured specifically for our areas, and the Pascagoula River is one area, the Pass cutting off to the Biloxi Bay, because once oil would get into those estuaries and into the bays and bayous, you're looking at thousands upon thousands of wetland acres that could be impacted. So, that was our fear, I will say, as a local elected official, was the long-term impact on our environment; and then, of course, the impact on tourism and fishing/shrimping industry.

So right now, we all serve on the governor's Gulf Restoration Commission. A vision plan will be presented September the 23rd. I would like to include in that plan even -- there's a lot

about studying and long-term effects on the environment in that plan, and there's some economic development. But, really, I would like to see more of what your bureau can do to ensure that we have an adequate oil spill response in the future because what we had was old, fifty-year-old technology. It was -- I think the unified command

deserved the Headless Chicken Award, quite frankly, and that we just do better. We need to do better.

If we used Europe as a model, let's do that. Obviously, you've got the expertise here. You saw the panel this morning. We have the capacity here to build these vessels here. And, certainly, we would like to see the Federal Government response immediately to let's get this up in gear and get going. Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Thank you very much. We really appreciate your comments. Supervisor Rockco.

MS. ROCKCO: Thank you, again. I concur with my colleagues in our appreciation to having you visit the Mississippi Gulf Coast and listen to some of our -- our concerns.

Again, I will reiterate that the area contingency plan was inadequate to say the least. We suffered some of the same issues over and over again, and we had a 60-day period from the time that the oil hit Louisiana shores until it hit Louisi- -- Mississippi. We brought forth many ideas because we felt that we were not being taken care of whatsoever. So, once those ideas reached incident command, they disappeared.

So, incident command in the wake of a crisis -- we saw this in Katrina and we see it here -- does not work. It is much too big. It

has too many layers, and it's not from the bottom up as it's designed; it's from the top down.

And we have a 26-mile manmade beach, which is much different than the -- our sister state, Alabama, and also Louisiana -- I mean, Louisiana, of course, they can't decide whether they're going to be land or water, as we heard that earlier. But our beach is much different, our -- the bathymetry of the water is -- is different. It's much shallower than any of our coastlines, so -- of our neighboring states, so it's very important that we be looked at individually, even though -- and that we be regulated individually, as well.

The shallow skimmers are much better, and also Kevin Costner's idea, that's technology that should have been in place. There's no arsenal available. With BP or the Marine Spill Response Corporation, is not -- the Corps doesn't work as first responders because they -- they work -- seem to work in a vacuum, not taking into accountability the resources of the individuals who are first responders, boots on the ground on a local level.

Also, the GOMESA is very important. That funding is extremely important to the Mississippi Gulf Coast in restoration projects throughout our county. I cannot -- and I would say the entire coastline, our coastal three counties; Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson.

Also, some of the varying -- some of the

things that we ran into, as well, is there was no plan for disposal. We do understand that the oil, after it came up on the shore was tarballs and they were going to pick those up. Then what do they do with them? There was no con- -- there was no plan. There was no plan for a hurricane out of incident command until much, much later, until -- until the crisis was almost over.

There is technology available to take care of oil spills and that technology was presented over and over to BP, and also to DEQ, and to the Department of Marine Resources. But again, it could not get through the barrier that we had. Technology that could -- pile layers, I think, are very -- and they made that presentation, and it was great. But instead, they chose at the last minute, to put it into a local landfill. And we didn't feel -- we did feel it was special waste, but it was mixed with the garbage, and also it came in and they said once it was weathered that it would be okay to put into a landfill or would be permissible, but we didn't see it that way. You shouldn't dump on us in our front yard and then turn around and dump on us in the backyard, not when there's technology available. And there is technology available for the crisis that we saw.

And the VOO program was a complete disaster. I went out there well into the spill, and I think Connie Moran -- we all have a -- we have a

boots-on-the-ground type of mentality here after Katrina. We helped people clean up their yard, even. But -- so, we wanted to see what was

happening, and we saw oil and dispersant. And at 2:00 in the afternoon, no one had any boom. There was -- what they called skimmers was two pleasure boats pulling 20 foot of boom, very unacceptable, in a straight line, and there was no oil there. It was down the road -- down the -- down the shore.

Dispersants are not used in Europe, so why are they used here? If we have effective skimmers that we can build right here in Harrison County, and dispersants, which we feel are an added problem to our environment and are very hazardous to -- if they don't use them in Europe, why do we use them here in the United States?

I guess that I just about covered everything and, again, I appreciate you coming. I appreciate you listening attentively. I hope that we can have -- that we will continue to be -- I also am on the five-state and the governor's commission task force, and I hope that we can continue to have a dialogue with local leaders and local civil defense directors who are used to crisis and hope we can have that dialogue to build a plan that will work for Harrison County and for all five states that have been affected by this oil. Thank

you.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Thank you. Thank you very much for your comments and observations. Supervisor Mangum.

MR. MANGUM: I appreciate the opportunity to be here, appreciate you being here to listen to our concerns. Being last on the list, though, in an effort not to recap everything that they said but to just highlight a few things, the NIM (phonetic) system for the unified command was built from the top down and it should have been built from the bottom up. Anytime that a response occurs, it has to be built from the bottom up. The people with the feet on the ground, the local response, has to be included in all of that, and we felt like that it was not something that we were able to get ready -- readily access to the information that we needed to respond to our citizens as they called in sightings of information and things. The information had to be relayed around through a number of avenues.

As has been stated, the response -- as it come ashore in Mississippi, the plan all along was -- is that we're going to battle this effort beyond the barrier islands before it gets to the

shore. The only problem with that was is that the equipment to do that battling wasn't in place so

that when it did come in, it come right on through the passes and the islands right on the shore.

So, we need -- we need to have equipment staged in the area. We need to have the materials, the booming, and that type of thing staged in the area. We need to have people, contractors in place that are trained to deal with the product in place to where they can do it. We also need the facilities to store that equipment in somewhere in the region to where that stuff is available to us.

One of the other things is that, as we've seen from previous disaster, I hope we'll do a lessons learned from this event and look at the materials that were used and the techniques, look at all of the things that were suggested that come out of this. When you look at the plans that were out of the -- that were available when the response started, some of that technology and some of those things fit maybe in other places. They didn't exactly fit here altogether. And so, we hope that they take all of that information along with the technology, the materials, and some of

the equipment that was done, and be able to come up with a lessons-learned plan that will add to the availability of being able to properly respond to it in the Gulf states, but also will not add tremendous amount of layer of bureaucracy to it because we don't need to -- we don't need to have to go through some of the things that we go

through to get equipment, to get response times, to get things in place.

As we learned and has been stated, the communications was a huge deal afterwards. I flew several times on the UH 72s, the helicopters out of the National Guard base. You could see product, you could see material, you could see the VOOs. You just couldn't communicate with them and tell them, You need to go over to the left just a little bit and you'll find it. And so eventually that did come about through the -- through the governor's office with some radio equipment that was made available, and that was given to the -- to the helicopters, to the Coast Guard, back to the area commands, back to the VOOs to where they could communicate.

We've got the technology available. If those guys out there had GPS units and they had radios,

it's not complicated. When the helicopter gets the points and be able to radio it down there, and they could go right to the spot and find the equipment -- find the material that's down there and be able to pick it up in a manner that will allow it to be done before it gets away from them to where they can't find it anymore.

So, just to kind of recap a little bit, we do need responsible drilling in the Gulf. We do need the drilling to be done. We need better oversight of the equipment that's out there so that we know that they're following the regulations that

they're supposed to be following; that we put things in place that will better protect us. But we need a better preparation plan in place, and we need a better response plan in place so that if something does happen, and we're all human and things will happen, that we're -- we have the availability to properly respond to those responses and that we've got the equipment and the materials to do it with, and the trained -- and technology of all -- everything that can be brought to bear on this.

We also need to -- need to look at the future of this. If anything happens again that --

especially in the Gulf, that there's some kind of coordination between organizations. I know there must be -- a couple of weeks ago, there probably was ten different people out there doing sampling and testing. We need to have a unified method of testing so that everybody is doing the same thing the same way and that we get all that information gathered in one database to where we can all share that information and know, because right now we've got -- we've got a situation where there is not a lot of confidence in the information that's coming out because there's different groups doing it, different agencies doing it. Nobody is communicating. We need to do a better job of communicating that information out so that everybody understands that if everybody is saying that the -- that the seafood is safe, the water is

open for fishing, that everybody can believe that information and that everybody can hear that information in one unified voice from all of the agencies that it's safe.

And because we live on -- we not only live with the offshore drilling, and that's part of our economy, we also live with the seafood industry, and that's part of our economy. Tourism is all

part of it. And we need to -- we need to do what we need -- what needs to be done to bring that back to our economy in the area because if we don't, we're going to have to look at different industries and a different way of doing things. And we provide a lot of seafood in the area that's shipped all over the country, and we want those folks in Maine, or in Boston, or in Seattle, Washington to feel comfortable about eating Gulf seafood.

Again, just thank you for the opportunity to be here and we appreciate y'all coming and being here and hearing our concerns. Thank you.

DIRECTOR BROMWICH: Thank you, Supervisor Mangum, and thank all four of you for providing really very relevant and informed comments. I think what was striking about all four of you is sort of the detailed information you had based on your own experiences through this crisis and these problems, and I think that's very useful for us, to hear from people who run the front lines and saw what worked, and you've been very frank about

what didn't work, and that I think is in some ways more important.

I'd like you to, as I invited the members of

the first panel, to take a look at the lessons-learned document that BP submitted to me last week, which is available online, and to comment on it from your own individual perspectives because that shouldn't be the last word on what worked and what didn't work. You have your own unique individual perspectives, which I think are very, very useful and will be useful to us as we move forward.

So, if you have the time and are interested in contributing to the continuing dialogue on that, that would be very significant. Supervisor Mangum, you mentioned the importance of having a lessons-learned exercise. I couldn't agree with you more. I think it's vital that we learn from this experience, which is why I directed BP to submit their own lessons-learned document on spill containment and spill response. But again, that can't and shouldn't be the last word on the subject. That needs to be a starting point, but a product that is built on and that becomes something robust enough that we can really learn the lessons and do better the next time. So, I invite you as I've invited others to please provide your experiences, your perspectives, to

the whole effort in the context of what BP has already said. And I think we can, by doing that, really develop an extremely strong lessons learned that we can move forward from.

So, again, thank all four of you very much for your contributions. And that ends our seventh public forum here in Biloxi, Mississippi. So, thanks, again.

MS. ROCKCO: Thank you for telling us about the BP because we didn't know about it.

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(Proceedings concluded at 12:00 p.m.)

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C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

COUNTY OF HARRISON

I, Lisa Hood Brown, CSR, Freelance Court Reporter and Notary Public, duly commissioned for the County of Harrison, State of Mississippi, do hereby certify;

That on the 10th of September, 2010, the preceding one hundred twenty (120) typewritten pages contain a full and correct copy of my stenotype notes and/or electronic tape recording of the proceedings;

That I am not related to or in anywise associated with any of the parties to this cause of action, or their counsel, and that I am not financially interested in the same;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand, this the 15th day of September, 2010.

_____
Lisa Hood Brown, CSR, Notary Public, State of Mississippi, County of Harrison. My commission expires 2/6/2014. CSR #1166

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